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Abstract 
 
 
In response to increasing health expenditures and a high number of physician visits, the 
German government introduced a copayment for ambulatory care in 2004 for individuals 
with statutory health insurance (SHI). Because persons with private insurance were 
exempt from the copayments, this health care reform can be regarded as a natural 
experiment. We used a difference-in-difference approach to examine whether the new 
copayment effectively reduced the overall demand for physician visits and to explore 
whether it acted as a deterrent to vulnerable groups, such as those with low income or 
chronic conditions. We found that there was no significant reduction in the number of 
physician visits among SHI members compared to our control group. At the same time, 
we did not observe a deterrent effect among vulnerable individuals. Thus, the copayment 
has failed to reduce the demand for physician visits. It is likely that this result is due to 
the design of the copayment scheme, as the copayment is low and is paid only for the first 
physician visit per quarter. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C13; I18; L31 
 
 
Keywords: copayments, ambulatory care, difference-in-difference, count data, zero-
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1. Introduction 
In many industrialized countries, health expenditures account for a substantial share of 
GDP and are increasing more rapidly than GDP in a considerable number of cases. 
Between these countries, however, there are large differences with respect to the share of 
health expenditures in GDP. Germany has the third-highest share of health expenditures 
among OECD countries. One of the more likely reasons for this can be found in the 
moral hazard inherent in public health care systems. Indeed, looking at the demand for 
ambulatory care in Germany, it is striking that the average person made 10.0 physician 
visits per year in 2006,1 whereas this same figure was 7.8 for all European countries and 
6.8 for the EU (World Health Organization 2008). 
 
To help counter increasing health expenditures and the high number of physician visits, 
the German government introduced a copayment of €10 per calendar quarter to be paid 
by individuals covered under statutory health insurance (SHI) upon their first contact 
with a physician’s or dentist’s office. The legislation came into effect on 1 January 2004 
and has attracted attention in many European countries, leading to discussions about 
introducing similar schemes. Like earlier attempts to reform the German health care 
system, the introduction of copayments for ambulatory care aimed at tackling the moral 
hazard problem. Exemption rules based on income and chronic disease status were 
defined as a way to avoid a deterrent effect that might cause certain vulnerable 
                                                 
1 In the absence of WHO data for Germany, we have used data on the number of physician contacts, 
provided by the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the year 2006. According to a study based on 
claims data from one of the largest German sickness funds, the average person in Germany makes as many 
as 16.3 physician visits annually (Gmünder Ersatzkasse 2006).  
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individuals, such as poor or disabled persons, or those with chronic disease, to avoid 
seeking necessary care. 
 
In this study we aimed to evaluate the effects of this reform. In particular, we analysed 
whether the reform has had an impact on the demand for ambulatory physician services 
while retaining the necessary and desirable demand of vulnerable groups. The reform can 
be regarded as a natural experiment, because privately insured individuals are fully 
exempt from the copayments. Thus, within the framework of this natural experiment, we 
used a difference-in-difference approach, comparing the demand for physician visits 
before and after the reform among individuals with SHI and those with private insurance. 
At the same time, we examined the effects of the reform on vulnerable groups. 
 
2. Copayments for ambulatory care in the German health care system 
The German health care system is dominated by statutory heath insurance (SHI), which is 
financed primarily by mandatory payroll deductions. Nearly 88% of the population is 
covered by comprehensive SHI. Beyond a certain income threshold, employees can 
decide either to remain in the SHI or to obtain private health insurance (PHI) instead. 
Self-employed persons can always choose between SHI and PHI. Approximately 6% of 
the population is fully covered by PHI. Another 6%, including civil servants, pensioners, 
or their families, are covered by governmental schemes (GS). All persons insured under 
SHI, PHI, or GS have access to a comprehensive benefit catalogue covering hospital 
services, ambulatory visits, pharmaceuticals, medical aids, etc. Ambulatory services 
include visits to general practitioners, specialists, and dentists. Before 2004, patients with 
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SHI were not required to make copayments for ambulatory physician visits. However, 
other types of copayments have a long tradition in the SHI system. Copayments are 
required, for example, for prescription drugs, hospital care, or health care-related 
transportation. These copayments have not had a substantial impact on the demand for 
health care services, and can thus be described as having a pure funding effect. 
 
As part of the Statutory Health Insurance Modernization Act, copayments for doctor 
visits were introduced with effect from 1 January 2004. One copayment of €10 per 
calendar quarter is paid by patients upon their first visit to a physician’s office. 
Subsequent visits to the same physician during the same quarter do not require a 
copayment. Similarly, visits to other physicians during the same quarter do not require a 
copayment if the patient presents a referral from the first physician. However, patients 
who visit another physician during the same quarter without a referral by the first 
physician must make an additional copayment of €10. Thus, if a patient always presents a 
referral from the first physician, the total fee will be €10 per quarter.  
 
This new copayment regulation was fully applied only to persons covered by SHI. 
Persons with PHI and some individuals with GS are exempt from the regulation. Children 
and adolescents up to the age of 18 who are covered by SHI are excluded, as well. In 
order to reduce the financial burden of the various copayments, individuals covered by 
SHI who have spent more than 2% of their gross household income per annum on 
copayments of any kind (e.g. for pharmaceuticals) are eligible for exemption from the 
physician fee. This also applies to SHI members with chronic conditions once they have 
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spent more than 1% of their gross household income per annum on copayments of any 
kind (the so-called 1% rule). Figure 1 summarizes the application of the copayments 
according to insurance status. 
 
Figure 1. Application of copayments according to insurance status 
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Fully exempt      
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Source: own figures based on data from the German Federal Ministry of Health (2007), Association of 
Private Health Insurance (2007), and a Federal Ministry of Health estimate of SHI members with chronic 
conditions and/or low income. Displayed groups do not add up to 100% because 0.2% of the population is 
uninsured. 
 
Based on economic theory, as well as on experiences with previous health care reforms in 
Germany and elsewhere, one would expect the introduction of copayments for 
ambulatory care to lead to a decline in the number of physician visits. Most previous 
studies on natural experiments in this area have been conducted in the US and Canada, 
and suggest that copayments in ambulatory care are an effective way to reduce the 
number of physician visits. Cherkin et al (1990) showed that a copayment of 
approximately US$5 resulted in a 14% decrease in physical examinations. Scitovsky and 
McCall (1977) found an even stronger effect, with the introduction of a 25% coinsurance 
provision leading one year later to approximately 24% fewer physician visits. Although 
the authors also argued that this was potentially a short-lived effect that could fade over 
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time, the results of a follow-up study showed evidence that the number of doctor visits 
either remained much the same or was even slightly lower.  
 
Although copayments have frequently been found to be effective in reducing the number 
of physician visits, they can also act as a deterrent to vulnerable groups if the system of 
copayments is not carefully designed (i.e. if the rules for exemption do not have the 
intended effect). There is substantial evidence from countries other than Germany that a 
change in copayments can discourage vulnerable groups from seeking necessary care. In 
a study described by Roemer et al (1975), only short-term effects could be observed. 
Imposing user charges of approximately US$1 for the first two doctor visits initially 
reduced demand for physician services, but led over the long-term to levels higher than 
those observed in the control group, thus offsetting any savings. The long-term effects of 
copayments were also analysed by Beck and Horne (1980) for members of a universal 
public medical care and hospital insurance programme in Canada. Between 1968 and 
1971, the Province of Saskatchewan imposed user charges of approximately 33%. 
Although this clearly reduced the number of physician visits, the findings of the study 
showed that it was primarily elderly and low-income individuals who had been affected. 
Moreover, when considering substitution effects, the authors concluded that the reform 
had not led to significant cost savings. This finding was complemented by Manning et al 
(1987), who showed that a reduction in the use of physician services can also be 
accompanied by increased treatment intensity in the form of longer or more expensive 
treatment episodes. In a Swedish study presented by Elofsson et al (1998), costs appeared 
to be the main barrier to seeking care. Roughly 22% of all respondents within a random 
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sample of individuals aged 17 or above stated that copayments had caused them to forgo 
a doctor’s visit at least once during the previous year. This decision was strongly 
associated with poor financial circumstances. Among those who assessed their financial 
situation to be poor, the probability of foregoing care was 10 times higher than among 
those who assessed their financial situation to be fair or good. However, among women, 
avoiding physician visits was also associated with chronic disease. 
 
Winkelmann (2004) examined whether increased copayments for prescription drugs in 
Germany, a measure introduced as part of an earlier health care reform in 1997, had 
indirect effects on the number of physician visits. Since prescriptions are issued by 
physicians, Winkelmann argued that the demand for prescription drugs and the demand 
for physician visits are intrinsically linked. He concluded that increased copayments 
reduced the number physician visits by approximately 10% on the average. 
 
Our study adds to earlier approaches by conceptually dividing the copayment effect into 
two effects. Firstly, a person may want to avoid making a copayment for the first visit per 
quarter and thus not visit any physician at all during that quarter. Secondly, a person may 
reduce the number of physician visits after the first visit due to the increased transaction 
costs of obtaining the necessary referrals. Consequently, we investigated whether (a) the 
probability of visiting a physician has decreased and (b) the demand for physician visits 
declined among non-exempt SHI members since the introduction of copayments 
compared to the PHI members as our control group. We also investigated whether 
vulnerable groups such as members of the SHI with chronic conditions or low income 
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have shown lower demand for physician visits since the introduction of copayments 
compared to our control group. 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
The primary data source in this study is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) (see 
Wagner et al 2007). Initiated in 1984, the SOEP is a representative longitudinal survey of 
approximately 22,000 individuals aged 16 and above living in private households. Part of 
the core questionnaire, which is administered each year, gathers data on health-related 
variables such as current health status, insurance status, and health care utilization (e.g. 
number of physician visits over the past 3 months). Because 2004 was the year of the 
intervention, we used data from the pre-intervention years 2000-2003 and the post-
intervention years 2005-2006. We excluded all individuals under the age of 18, as well as 
GS members, from the dataset, because it seemed likely that the age restriction and 
changes to the reimbursement system of the GS during the post-reform period would 
make these groups unsuitable as controls. As a result, only data on PHI members, and on 
SHI members over the age of 18, remained in the dataset. 
 
Our study approach was to pool the data from the abovementioned 5 years (i.e. from 
2000-2003 and 2005-2006) and to estimate the effects of copayments by comparing the 
expected number of physician visits before and after the intervention using a difference-
in-difference (DID) approach (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002; Wooldridge, 2002). Few 
studies have used a DID approach to measure the effects of changes in copayment 
(Winkelmann, 2004; Zhang, 2007). In the present study, we used the following model: 
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where is the outcome variable for person  at time . ijy i t ix is the treatment vector 
indicating whether person  is subject to the increased copayment, while  indicates the 
occurrence of the copayment in period . The interaction term denotes the utilization of a 
person who was required to make a copayment after the new copayment came into effect. 
The vector  represents a variety of socio-economic characteristics that we controlled 
for. 
i tz 
t
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We constructed 4 DID estimators, each of which was related to a pre-post change in 
physician visits. Firstly, we compared non-exempt SHI members to PHI members to 
explore whether the introduction of copayments had led to a general reduction in the 
demand for physician visits. Secondly, the group of SHI members with chronic 
conditions was compared to the group of PHI members to investigate whether vulnerable 
groups had been affected by the copayment reform. We followed the official definition of 
‘chronic condition’, based upon which affected individuals can qualify for the so-called 
1% rule. We included persons with approved disability of more than 60% or who had 
qualified as beneficiaries of long-term care insurance (grades II or III). It should be 
pointed out here that there may be other persons who qualify for exemption based on 
individual conditions that could not be captured in this study. Thirdly, we sought to 
define a group of persons with low income whose total copayments (for ambulatory care 
and other services) most likely exceeded the threshold of 1% or 2% of gross household 
income per annum. Thus the lowest income quintile was taken as a proxy for SHI 
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members with low income and compared to PHI members. Finally, as an alternative 
proxy for low income we included all persons who received public welfare benefits and 
compared this group to the group of PHI members. Public welfare recipients are not 
generally exempt from copayments in the SHI in Germany, but given their relatively low 
transfer income, copayments can easily exceed the 1% income threshold. However, as 
long as the transfer income of these individuals does not exceed the income threshold, 
one may assume a significant decline in the demand for physician visits.  
 
Throughout the models, we controlled for a number of variables reflecting socio-
economic characteristics, including gender, age, age-squared, existence of children in 
household (i.e. implying additional time and effort when consulting a physician), 
employment status (i.e. full-time, part-time, or unemployed), self-employment, 
educational level, resident of former East or West Germany, active sports, smoker, 
household income in quintiles and population at residence location. In addition, we 
controlled for health by including a variable on self-reported health based on the 
categories very good, good, fair, poor, and very poor. Variables for years and months 
were used to control for all other unobserved temporal factors affecting demand for 
physician visits. Controlling for months is particularly important in this context, because 
interviews take place in different months of the year and seasonal influences such as 
influenza during the winter months may otherwise bias the results. A descriptive 
overview of the sample is given in the appendix.  
 
To model the impact of the copayment regulation, we proceeded in two steps. Firstly, we 
used a probit model to evaluate whether the probability of visiting a physician had 
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decreased following the introduction of copayments. In this model, the outcome variable 
takes the value of 1 if the person has visited a physician and 0 if not. As can be seen in 
figure 2, the percentage of individuals who visited a physician during the past 3 months 
has decreased slightly over the last 10 years (i.e. from approximately 72% to less than 
69% in 2006). However, the introduction of the copayment in 2004 appears to have had 
no impact on the demand for physician visits.  
 
Figure 2. Percentage of individuals who had visited a physician during the past 3 months 
1995-2006 
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68
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72
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
 
Source: SOEP, including all groups. 
 
Secondly, when choosing an appropriate econometric model to examine whether the 
number of physician visits declined after the introduction of copayments, we had to 
consider that the distribution of our dependent variable ‘number of physician visits’ was 
largely skewed to the right and contained a large proportion of zeros. Figure 2 displays 
the kernel densities for the entire sample (i.e. including all groups). Probit or logit models 
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would most likely have produced inefficient estimates in this context. Several estimation 
techniques have been proposed in the literature to deal with distributional characteristics 
like these. Among them are Poisson and negative binomial (NB) models, as well as zero-
inflated Poisson (ZIP) and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models (Sheu et al, 
2004; Yau et al, 2003). 
 
Figure 3. Number of physician visits during the past 3 months 
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Source: SOEP, pooled information for the years 2000-2003 and 2005-2006. 
 
We started with a basic Poisson model where the number of physician visits y for 
individual  has a Poisson distribution with a conditional mean i λ  depending on the 
individual characteristics x: 
(1) ( ) ixi i iE y x e βλ = ⏐ =  
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The probability of y given x is: 
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One of the main assumptions of the Poisson distribution is that variance is equal to the 
mean. However, in the presence of overdispersion, estimates made based on a Poisson 
regression model will most likely be inefficient. Overdispersion is characterized by 
excess zeros and/or unobservable individual characteristics. While excess zeros are 
obviously an issue, unobservable individual characteristics may also be relevant to this 
study. Although socio-demographic characteristics and self-perceived health may capture 
a fair portion of the variation in demand for physician visits, there are most likely further 
determinants of health that cannot be controlled for. In order to address the potential 
problem of overdispersion, we applied an NB regression as a second model. In this 
second model, unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account by adding an error term  
to the conditional mean of the Poisson distribution: 
ε
(3) ( ) ( )~ i ixi i iE y x e β ελ += ⏐ =  
 
Because 31% (see Figure 3) of all persons in the full sample answered that they had not 
visited any physician at all during the past 3 months, excess zeros are clearly an issue in 
our data. We also assumed that some of the persons in our sample never visit physicians 
(necessary zeros), whereas others occasionally visit physicians, but just happened not to 
do so during our survey (potential zeros). Therefore, it is reasonable to model as a 
mixture of two distributions: 
iy
• Responses that are zero with a probability one, and 
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• Responses that follow another model such as a Poisson or NB distribution 
 
This problem can be addressed by applying the ZIP and ZINB models. In these models, 
the likelihood of being in either group is estimated using a logit or probit specification, 
whereas the counts in the second regime are estimated using a Poisson or NB 
specification (Lambert, 1992). 
 
It would also have been possible to apply a two-part/hurdle model, which is used 
frequently for count data when, for instance, the recurrence of cancer is measured (Jones 
2000). This model would assume that each person has the same risk of needing to visit a 
physician. However, some persons never visit physicians, even in the case of serious 
illness. Therefore, from a conceptual point of view, the ZINB model would appear to be 
more appropriate in this particular context. Sheu et al 2004 argued in a similar manner 
when analysing count data on smoking behaviour. 
 
To determine the best model fit among ZINB, ZIP, NB, and Poisson, we followed the 
steps proposed by Greene (1994) and Grootendorst (1995). Firstly, we applied the Vuong 
test (Vuong, 1989), which compares the conditional model with the true conditional 
distribution, to determine whether the ZINB model (with its inherent splitting 
mechanism) should be rejected in favour of the NB model. In either case, we would 
proceed with the second step and test for heterogeneity by using the t test. A significant 
alpha suggests that unobservable heterogeneity accounts for dispersion. In this case the 
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NB model would be more efficient than the Poisson model, and the ZINB model would 
be more efficient than the ZIP model. 
 
For each of the four comparator groups, we estimated fixed effects and random effects 
models. However we only reported on fixed effects models, as these provided more 
consistent estimates, a decision that was also supported by the Hausman Test. Because 
ZIP and ZINB are not available as panel models, we allowed for clustering in both 
models.2 In order to reduce multicollinearity, we dropped explanatory variables if they 
had high variance inflation factors. We reported marginal effects throughout the models. 
 
4. Results 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the number of physician visits for non-exempt SHI members and 
PHI members developed between 2000 and 2006. The upper two lines indicate the 
average number of physician visits for those who made at least one physician visit per 
quarter, whereas the lower lines indicate the average number of physician visits for all 
persons within each of the groups. Although there was a general trend towards a decrease 
in the number of physician visits for non-exempt SHI members, the number dropped 
sharply for both lines after the introduction of copayments in 2004, but rose to nearly pre-
2004 levels in 2005. Although PHI members are exempt from copayments, the number of 
physician visits among these individuals showed a similar drop after the introduction of 
copayments in 2004. One reason for this unexpected decrease in the number of physician 
visits among PHI members may be due to the general population’s uncertainty about the 
                                                 
2 For sensitivity purposes we also allowed for clustering in the probit and count data models, but this did 
not lead to any relevant differences. Results can be provided from the authors on request.  
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new system of copayments. Indeed, the copayments were the subject of intense 
discussion in the media at the time and the rules for exemption were not fully transparent. 
 
Figure 4. Number of physician visits during the previous quarter for PHI members and 
non-exempt SHI members 
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Source: SOEP, years 2000-2003 and 2005-2006. 
 
Table I displays the marginal effects for the group differences and DID estimates of the 
probit model. We observed significant group differences (a) between non-exempt SHI 
members and PHI members, and (b) between SHI members with chronic conditions and 
PHI members. Both groups of SHI members had a higher probability of physician visits. 
While this finding is not surprising for those with chronic conditions, it must also me 
taken into account that PHI members tend to be better risks compared to non-exempt SHI 
members. The only individuals for whom the probability of visiting a physician 
decreased (by 7.9%) after the reform (i.e. compared to PHI members) were those in the 
lowest income quintile, whereas the other DID estimators had positive signs. However, 
none of the changes indicated by the DID estimators were significant. 
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Table I. DID estimates for the probit models 
Model Marg. Eff. Standard Error
SHI w./o. exemption
SHI  0.122***  0.022
DiD SHI  0.019  0.029
SHI w. chronic conditions
Chronic  0.879***  0.059
DiD Chronic  0.099  0.074
SHI-lowest income quintile
Lowest income quintile  0.023  0.064
DiD Lowest income quintile -0.079  0.053
SHI-public welfare
Public assistance  0.063  0.070
DiD Public assistance  0.007  0.063
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1
Treatment group vs. PHI as control group                Probit Model
 
Source: SOEP, pooled information for survey years 2000-2003, 2005- 2006 
 
Apart from the count data model with the group made up of persons from the lowest 
income quintile, the estimated results of all performed models show overdispersion 
expressed by significant Ln alphas. Therefore, throughout table II, we present NB and 
ZINB models, but show only a Poisson model for the lowest income quintile group. 
Because the Vuong test, which compares the conditional model with the true conditional 
distribution, cannot be performed when we allow for clustering, we also performed ZINB 
models without a clustering effect to produce results for the Vuong test. Throughout the 
models, the Vuong test suggests that the ZINB models are more efficient than the NB 
models. In each model we show marginal effects and their standard errors for the group 
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difference, as well as the DID estimators. In addition, for the ZINB model, coefficients 
are presented separately for each of the two regimes. 
 
The estimated marginal effects differed slightly between the NB and ZINB models, 
which was due to the fact that ZINB estimates are conditional on having had at least one 
physician visit. According to the NB and ZINB models for the first comparator group 
(i.e. non-exempt SHI members), the DID estimates showed reductions of 2.3% and 5.5%, 
none of which, however, were significant.  
 
It is notable that, based on the NB model, the number of visits among persons with 
chronic conditions dropped significantly (i.e. by 6.1%) after the introduction of 
copayments, and by 8.6% in the lowest income quintile group. However, the DID 
estimates became insignificant in the ZINB model, and the DID estimate for persons with 
chronic conditions actually became positive. Finally, the DID estimate for persons 
receiving public welfare benefits suggests a reduction in the expected number of 
physician visits of 6.5% in the NB model and of 4.9% in the ZINB model, which was 
conditional on the patient making at least one visit per quarter. However, the effects 
observed in both models were insignificant. 
17 
Table II. DID estimates for the count data models and the zero-inflated count data models 
Combined
Model Marg. Eff. SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Marg. Eff.
SHI w./o. exemption
SHI  0.133***  0.022 -0.047**  0.023 -0.004  0.030 -0.001
DiD SHI -0.023  0.022 -0.196  0.054 -0.038  0.076 -0.055
Ln -0.194***  0.011 -0.403***  0.009
Voung test of ZINB vs. ZIP  24.87***
SHI w. chronic condition
Chronic  0.620***  0.057  0.255***  0.042  0.003  0.037  0.947
DiD Chronic -0.061**  0.029 -1.373***  0.318 -1.890  7.470  0.100
Ln -0.296***  0.0244 -0.519***  0.018
Voung test of ZINB vs. ZIP  13.81***
SHI-lowest income quintile
Lowest income quintile  0.130*  0.071 -0.075  0.076  0.008  0.048 -0.128
DiD Lowest income quintile -0.086**  0.019 -0.100  0.191  0.129  0.155 -0.015
Ln -0.005  0.024 -0.234***  0.022
Voung test of ZINB vs. ZIP 11.20***
SHI-public welfare
Public assistance  0.108  0.088  0.010  0.069 -0.049  0.060 -0.019
DiD Public assistance -0.065  0.059  0.136  0.199 -0.170  0.166 -0.049
Ln  0.080***  0.026 -0.157***  0.026
Voung test of ZINB vs. ZIP  9.34***
***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1
Treatment group vs. PHI as control group Negative Binomial Model
                             Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model
      Probit Model       Count Model
α
α
α
α
 
Source: SOEP, pooled information for survey years 2000-2003, 2005-2006 
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5. Discussion  
 
In this study, we examined the effects of introducing quarterly copayments for 
ambulatory care in Germany in 2004. We developed a DID framework by using PHI 
members as a control group throughout the models. For our modelling approach, we 
subdivided the effects of the copayment conceptually and proceeded in two steps. We 
first applied a probit model measuring the probability of visiting a physician and 
subsequently applied count data models measuring the change in the number of physician 
visits. Our study expands upon approaches to measuring the effect of copayments by 
adding a zero-inflated negative binomial model within a DID framework. This model 
allowed us to differentiate between persons who never visit physicians and persons who 
occasionally visit a physician. 
 
Our results suggest that the copayment initially reduced the number of physician visits in 
2004, the year of the intervention. However there was no significant reduction in the 
number of non-exempt SHI members with at least one physician visit, or in the overall 
number of physician visits made by non-exempt SHI members compared to our control 
group. Our findings suggest that the introduction of this specific copayment has had only 
a transitory effect and has failed to reduce the demand for physician visits. It is likely that 
this result is due to the design of the copayment scheme. The copayment is low and has to 
be paid only for the first visit per quarter and not for each visit (i.e. as long as patients 
present a referral from the first physician). Thus, the potential behaviour-modifying effect 
of the copayments largely disappears after the first physician visit. Evidence from the US 
suggests that a copayment for each visit might be more effective (Cherkin et al, 1990; 
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Scitovsky and McCall, 1977). For example, in a study on HMO enrolees in Washington 
State, Cherkin et al (1990) found that a copayment of only $5 per physician visit led to a 
significant decrease in the overall number of visits. For Germany, Winkelmann’s findings 
(2004) also suggest that the 1997 increase in copayments for prescription drugs was more 
effective at reducing the number of physician visits than the copayment scheme examined 
in this study.  
 
According to our results, there is no evidence that the copayment introduced in 2004 
decreased the probability that persons with chronic conditions or low income will visit a 
physician. However, the results of the NB models indicate that persons with chronic 
conditions and low income, defined as the lowest income quintile, significantly reduced 
their number of physician visits compared to our control group. These results have to be 
interpreted with caution, because both effects were only significant at the 0.05 level and 
became insignificant in the ZINB models, which were found to be more appropriate for 
the structure of our data. Therefore, based on our ZINB models, we have to conclude that 
the copayments do not act as a deterrent among vulnerable populations. This result may 
be due either to the low amount of the copayment or the effectiveness of the income 
thresholds. 
 
It is important to consider the limitations of our study when interpreting its results. 
Before the health care reform in 2004, a number of over-the-counter (OTC) drugs were 
still in the SHI benefit catalogue. After the reform, however, these were completely 
excluded. This also has the potential to lead to a reduction in the number of physician 
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visits. Although our data do not allow us to control for this effect, it is unlikely that this 
has subjected our study results to bias, because the copayments for prescriptions before 
the reform often exceeded the price for OTCs. 
 
Our observations have important policy implications for decision-makers in Germany and 
other countries. Given the current framework, the copayments for ambulatory care in 
Germany have a pure funding effect and do not provide behavioural incentives with 
respect to physician visits. If decision-makers intend to reduce moral hazard effectively, a 
different copayment scheme is needed. Based on the US experience, imposing 
copayments for each physician visit might be more effective. An alternative might be to 
launch prevention programmes that focus on helping vulnerable groups avoid certain 
health problems and the physician visits that these would entail. This could reduce the 
financial burden for vulnerable groups and has the potential to decrease overall health 
expenditures.  
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Appendix: Descriptive overview of the sample 
 PHI SHI w/o exemption 
SHI with 
chronic 
conditions 
SHI poor SHI with public welfare 
 Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Physician contact 0.60 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.94 0.24 0.69 0.46 0.63 0.48 
No. physician visits 2.03 3.30 2.31 3.35 6.04 5.95 2.63 3.80 2.43 3.76 
Current health status           
  Very good 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.08 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30 
  Good 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.07 0.25 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 
  Fair 0.29 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.31 0.46 
  Poor 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.33 0.36 0.48 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.37 
  Very poor 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.45 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.21 
Active sports 0.41 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.41 0.13 0.34 
Smoker 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.18 0.38 0.33 0.47 0.53 0.50 
Household Income            
  1. quintile 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42 1.00 0.00 0.62 0.48 
  2. quintile 0.06 0.23 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.39 
  3. quintile 0.11 0.31 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.28 
  4. quintile 0.19 0.39 0.21 0.41 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.22 
  5. quintile 0.58 0.49 0.19 0.39 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 
Male 0.61 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.42 0.49 
Age 47.5 16.1 46.5 17.1 63.6 14.8 46.3 19.7 39.7 14.5 
Age squared 2514 1585 2457 1697 4271 1776 2528 1964 1788 1276 
Children in household 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.29 0.19 0.39 
Educational level           
  High 0,39 0.49 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 
  Medium 0.44 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 
  Without any degree 0.16 0.37 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.49 
  Information is   
  Missing 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 
Employment status           
  Full-time empl. 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 
  Part-time empl. 0.04 0.20 0.11 0.31 0.02 0.15 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.25 
  Unemployed 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.38 0.49 0.50 
Self-employed 0.30 0.46 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.16 
West-German 0.87 0.33 0.74 0.44 0.77 0.42 0.73 0.44 0.65 0.48 
Population at 
residence location           
  < 2,000 0.06 0.24 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26 
  2 -5,000 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 
  5-20,000 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35 
  20-50,000 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39 
  50.-100,000 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 
  100.-500,000 0.19 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.21 0.41 
  >500,000 0.17 0.38 0.11 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37 
Month of interview           
  January 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.40 0.10 0.30 
  February 0.23 0.42 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.47 
  March 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.43 
  April 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.35 
  May 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26 
  June 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
  July 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.19 
  August 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14 
  September 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.10 
  October 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.06 
N 14,762 121,876 7,998 8,184 4,317 
Source: SOEP, pooled information for survey years 2000-2003, 2005-2006.  
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